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This study is a political historical account of the significance of the Turkish
Labor Party (TLP) (Türkiye 
 
[IDOT  ] [SCEDIL] çi Partisi) in Turkish politics and among the Turkish left in
light of the party’s parliamentary experience between 1965 and 1969. The TLP’s entrance
into the National Assembly was an important milestone and a unique phenomenon in
modern Turkish politics. The TLP’s insistence on the use of parliamentary and constitu-
tional means to come to power was its distinctive feature; and it was this characteristic that
distinguished the party from other main organizations and movements of the Turkish left in
the 1960s.
 








) was founded just after the
military intervention in 1960. Although various socialist movements and parties had
been formed in the past, none of them has had as serious an impact on Turkish poli-
tics as the TLP went on to have. The TLP’s entry into the National Assembly in
1965 considerably increased its significance both within the Turkish leftist move-
ment and Turkish politics. For the first time in Turkish history, socialist deputies as
members of a socialist party entered the National Assembly and, for the first time,
socialist ideas found formal representation in the parliament. In spite of its limited
weight in the National Assembly, the party played an important role as part of the
parliamentary opposition and left its mark on the Turkish political history of the
1960s.
The TLP, from its very foundation, was always a firm supporter of attaining
power through parliamentary means. The party’s parliamentary experience was a
unique phenomenon in the modern Turkish political history. However, this experi-
ence was not strong enough to initiate a new political tradition in the Turkish politi-
cal system and thus could not be transmitted to the following decades. The
movement lost its momentum and failed towards the end of the 1960s and never
emerged as an influential political factor afterwards. Although the TLP and the
Turkish left, in general, had responsibilities for the failure of this experience, the
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a real threat to the existing order, did not allow the TLP to function within the
constitutional framework and to construct its historical institutional tradition within
the same political system.
This article, based on primary documents, first, outlines some of the general char-
acteristics of the Turkish left during the 1960s, and then, concentrates on the differ-
ent methods of attaining political power proposed by the main Turkish leftist
factions of the period. After entering the parliament, the political and ideological
authority of the TLP over other sections of the Turkish left increased considerably.
However, this never meant that the parliamentarist strategy of the TLP was not chal-
lenged by the other segments of the movement. By comparing the major leftist
groups of the 1960s, I will try to present briefly the main distinguishing feature of
the TLP, its insistence on parliamentary and constitutional means to come to power.





 In this section, first, the part played by the TLP in the 1965 general elections,
which was the first major political test of the party, is examined; and then, the
parliamentary performance of the TLP is analyzed.
 
Turkish Socialism in the 1960s
 
The decade following the military coup of May 27, 1960, which marked a turning
point in Turkish political history, was a period of rapid transformation in many
aspects. Although the foundations of the regime remained the same, the way politics
was carried out had been changed. In this period, the universities were guaranteed
greater autonomy; students were given freedom to organize their own associations;
and trade unions were given the right to strike and engage in collective bargaining.
The politicization of the intelligentsia, students, and workers accelerated in the same
period as well. Notwithstanding the socio-economic changes in the international and
domestic contexts in the Cold War era, which paved the way to the emergence of
class politics in Turkey, the involvement of radical leftist political groups in domes-
tic politics increased considerably once they were legally allowed to propagate their





The leftist intellectuals of the period genuinely welcomed the military interven-
tion. They considered the coup as a significant moment of Turkish political history
since it gave Turkish people a comprehensive constitution. Also, the coup was
thought to provide the Turkish socialist movement an important opportunity to orga-




Mehmet Ali Aybar, who later became the chairman of the TLP, was also of the same
opinion. In an open letter to President Cemal Gürsel on November 19, 1960, he
described the intervention of May 27 as a progressive movement, which, he also




Socialism in the 1960s was understood and introduced as an ideology to achieve rapid
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 Most of the
Turkish socialist groups were “theoretically and politically shackled to an obsolete





 This strategy was best represented by a political group that













lu after the military intervention. The programmatic approaches and
analyses that determined the political perceptions and perspectives of the Turkish left




 The “statement” on




 gives a general idea about the development strategy, the “philosophy of devel-




 It stated that 
the attainment of the level of modern civilization, the final solution of the prob-
lem of education, the enlivening of Turkish democracy, the realization of social
justice and the establishment of democratic regime can only be achieved by




Imperialism, feudalism, and the big comprador bourgeoisie were identified as the
main obstacles to initiating a rapid economic development and to establishing




 movement, the main political task was to
construct a national democratic front in which all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces
would unite in order to carry out a national democratic revolution.
In the second half of the 1960s, this national democratic revolution strategy also
became a dominant characteristic of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)









 Under the leadership of Belli, the
NDR movement gained ground among the university students and became one of
the significant socialist factions in Turkey in the second half of the decade. In many
respects, the political and ideological approaches of this newly shaped movement




 group. The NDR also believed that, in an underde-
veloped country like Turkey, the main struggle would be against imperialism and
feudalism. Since the proletariat was too weak as a class, revolutionary change could
only be carried out by a broad national front of all the exploited social classes and
groups, including intellectuals, officers and the national bourgeoisie. This revolution
directed against landowners and compradors would have a national and democratic
character, not a socialist one.
When compared with the other leftist groups, the impact of the TLP on Turkish
politics and the socialist movement was more significant due to several reasons.
Above all, the TLP was the main legal party of the left and it served as a “labora-




 For the party, the main task of the Turkish social-
ists was not a national democratic revolution but a socialist transformation which,
of course, would be carried out by democratic and constitutional means. Its ideol-
ogy was an amalgamation of Kemalism, Western social democracy and Marxian




































union leaders who believed that a political party represented in the parliament could




 On February 1, 1962,
Mehmet Ali Aybar was offered the leadership of the TLP. After this date, the party
entered into a new phase during which it matured into a socialist party and became
an active political force in the rest of the 1960s.
From TLP’s first national congress in Izmir in 1964, to its fourth congress in
Ankara in 1970, the party’s strategy and political orientation was persistently an
issue of controversy among its ranks. The first serious dispute within TLP
members was between the party leadership and the proponents of the NDR strat-
egy. In spite of the enduring opposition of the supporters of the NDR line, the
party adopted a strategy advocating the indivisibility of the national-democratic









The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deepened and accelerated
the political and ideological rifts within the party’s leadership. Aybar spoke out
against the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. His protest against the inva-
sion also gave him the chance to express his understanding of socialism. He
clearly advocated a non-authoritarian, democratic version of socialism. Aybar was
accused by other party leaders, such as Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, for adopt-
ing new non-scientific theories on socialism. The crisis beginning with the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops was intensified by the failure of the
TLP in the 1969 elections. The struggle between the two factions of the party
resulted in Aybar’s resignation from chairman and his replacement by Boran in
1970.
By early 1971, Turkey was in a state of social unrest. The growing activities of
the radical leftist groups and rightist circles, and the increasing militancy of work-
ers’ demonstrations weakened the Demirel government to the point of paralysis.
Under these circumstances, the chief of the general staff issued a memorandum on
March 12, 1971 and interrupted the normal functioning of the parliamentary regime
by suspending democratic freedoms. Amidst this political atmosphere, earlier in
1971, the TLP had been accused of supporting the separatist tendencies of the Kurd-
ish people and taken to court by the state authorities. A resolution adopted in the
fourth congress of the party in October of 1970 had paved the way for this charge.
The resolution had declared that, 
It is the natural and requisite revolutionary duty of our Party… to support the
struggle of the Kurdish people, to make use of its constitutional citizenship




After the March 12 memorandum, on July 20, 1971, the TLP was closed down and
most of the party leaders were arrested. After the normalization of the political life
following the general elections of 1973, the socialist movement gained momentum
again. In this new political atmosphere, the party reorganized under the leadership
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TLP, having lost its ideological and political hegemony and authority over the entire
Turkish left, became a relatively marginal party.
 
Methods of Attaining Political Power
 
There were serious political differences between the main socialist groups of the
1960s regarding the methods of attaining political power. The leaders of the TLP
clearly stated, from the very beginning, their intention to follow the constitution and
democratic ways and to act within a legal framework to reach their political aims.
This intention was clearly expressed in the official party literature. In the party
program, it was asserted that 
[The TLP] comes to power by democratic electoral methods. By rejecting the
exploitation of man by man, remaining loyal to basic human rights and free-




The party program meticulously emphasized the importance of operating within the
constitutionalist framework.




 circle and the NDR
movement, on the other hand, paid scant attention to the constitutional and parlia-




 movement proposed a military coup for a
regime change led by progressive civil and military bureaucrats and intellectuals.




 group had serious doubts about the prospects of a








 circle, the backward social
and economic structures and conditions of the country would not allow the
progressive forces to come to power by election. Their claim was that in a coun-
try with a high illiteracy rate, the voters were under the ideological and political
hegemony of the ruling elite (landlords, the comprador bourgeoisie) and as such
could not act independently and could easily be manipulated by the reactionary
political forces.
Since the parliament was under the influence of the reactionaries and the
progressive forces were unable to seize power by electoral methods, from the




 circle, a radical transition in Turkey could only be brought
about by non-parliamentary means. The vanguard of this transition would be the
dynamic forces of the Turkish society under the leadership of the leftist officers










 circle found that a regime change
within the framework of the 1961 constitution could not be realized. Their faith in




 To elaborate his view, Avcıo
 
[GBREV] lu
asked which was more democratic, Atatürk’s authoritarian one-party regime
aiming at revolutions and land reform, or Demirel’s liberal regime which refused
to carry out the land reform. He answered by stating “the Atatürk regime












































 group, was in opposition to the TLP’s interpreta-
tion of the country’s social and economic conditions, its political strategy and its
parliamentary approach. Mihri Belli, the founding father of the NDR strategy,
asserted that in the reactionary parliamentary system of Turkey, believing that a
party could carry out change by electoral methods was an illusion and suited only




 The NDR movement from the end of
1969 onwards experienced inevitable rifts and fragmentations. The organizations
established thereafter mainly rested on university students, the most active and mili-




 In the deep-
ening political crisis and the growing social conflicts of the late 1960s, they decided
that political agitation was not enough by itself and came to the conclusion that an
armed guerilla struggle was necessary to carry out the desired national democratic
revolution. The state repressed these guerilla groups and persecuted thousands of




The embryonic guerilla groups were crushed by the intervention, putting a bloody
end to the romantic attempts of a generation.
The TLP leadership described these non-parliamentary strategies as petty bour-
geoisie claims, since socialism could be built neither by military coups nor by




circle), the preparation of the working class and its allies for power, the increase of
their hegemony in domestic politics and the gradual attainment of power by these
classes (through getting organized, learning through struggle, raising consciousness
in a political organization) was a long, slow, useless way. According to the TLP,
supporters of the non-parliamentary strategies wrongly believed that revolutionary
intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin, students and the cadres of revolutionary
officers had the force to carry out a revolution and to build socialism. By resting
upon these forces, the proponents of non-parliamentary strategies desired to find a




According to the members of the party, the 1961 constitution had a social charac-
ter: it was progressive, in favor of the people and did not present an obstacle to the
social development in Turkey. The new constitution, they argued, charged the state
to remove all political, economic, and social obstacles which restricted the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the individual in such a way as to be incompatible
with the principles of individual well-being, social justice and the rule of law; and to
bring about the conditions required for the material and spiritual development of the
individual. The logical conclusion of this argument was that the complete imple-





TLP leadership chose to struggle within the framework of the constitution, and
believed that, within this framework, the transition from capitalism to socialism




 Mehmet Ali Aybar, the chair-
man of the party, repeatedly asserted that, 
Our constitution is, with no doubt, open to socialism… Our constitution with
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 is in favor of the people and









But, would the ruling classes and their supporters, America, give permission to the
socialist party to attain power by elections? The party’s answer was that if the ruling
classes and their governments did not give permission to the TLP to win a majority
in the parliament and to take power, then they would lose their legitimacy and find
themselves behaving out of a constitutional and legal framework. In this situation
the party would exercise its right to resist against these unconstitutional and unlaw-
ful attempts. Either the ruling classes would eliminate the constitution and establish
a fascist order based on terror or the working classes and laborers would defend




The TLP in the National Assembly
 
The TLP was established in February 1961, but its significance as a political factor
on the Turkish political scene did not become apparent until its entrance into the
parliament four years later in October 1965, when it became the first socialist orga-
nization to be officially represented in the National Assembly. Although the TLP
had limited representation in the parliament, its deputies brought a new political atti-
tude and understanding to parliamentary politics. The party introduced new
concepts, such as class politics, class interests, and social justice, into Turkish polit-
ical life. Their opposition changed the very character of the political debates in the
parliament, giving them an ideological essence.
The 1965 general elections were the first major test for the TLP’s political perfor-
mance. Free electoral propaganda and the possibility of getting a small number of
spokesmen into the parliament made these elections critical for the party. The TLP
also saw the electoral platform as means to spread its political views among a larger
part of the population and widen its organization throughout the country. The party
had unofficially started its election campaign in January 1965, with a speech by
party chairman Mehmet Ali Aybar, who declared that “the coming general elections
mark a turning point in Turkish history... In these elections we must get a number of
deputies into the parliament.” The people’s problems would be expressed every day
in the parliament by the representatives of the laborers, and in this way, the awaken-
ing of the people would be accelerated and the level of the people’s organization
would be raised significantly. “So that… our laboring people, that is to say, the




The 1965 general elections had essential political differences when compared to
the earlier elections. For the first time topics such as socialism, capitalism, land
reform, foreign policy and economic development became issues of election





 In the election campaign of 1965, the TLP differed from the other



































considerably different discourse in its election propaganda. Its manifesto for the
1965 elections started with an address to workers, day laborers, peasants, artisans,




 In the manifesto, it
was stated that “we are against all of the other five parties. We are radically differ-
ent from them: We are the party of the laboring people.” So, in the elections, “there
are actually two parties contesting: One of them defends the interests of the land-




); the other party is yours. It is the party of labor,




The TLP’s election campaign mainly emphasized a non-capitalist path of devel-
opment in its economic orientation. This basically meant that a rapid national
economic and social development through capitalism was simply impossible. The
TLP advocated a national development strategy, which could be realized only by
implementing a planned statism, a policy of nationalization of all heavy industry,
foreign trade and banking, and state ownership of all minerals and an extensive land
reform. Foreign policy was another major topic discussed by the party during the
campaign period. The TLP continuously declared that Turkey was no country’s
satellite and that it needed to regain its complete independence from the US domina-









 but also faced with the physical and verbal attacks of other parties.
The last situation polarized the political atmosphere, intensified the growing ideo-
logical tension during the election campaign. The people who played prominent
roles in these attacks for the most part were supporters of the Association for


















electoral promises were equated with communism and the party members were





were not limited to these facile charges; on several occasions, meetings held by









 The party claimed that those who accused the TLP of commu-
nism were trying to alienate the masses from the TLP.
In spite of all the problems confronting the TLP during its election campaign, it
won 15 seats in the parliament, which allowed the party to form a parliamentary





 and received 276,101 votes (2.82 percent of the total vote). Thir-
teen of the 15 deputies of the TLP entered the parliament as a result of the national





 One of the TLP’s most notable promises during the election
campaign had been the representation of workers and peasants in the parliament by
workers and peasants. However, the favored places had been given to intellectuals
and leading members of the party in order to assure their election to the parliament.





 The party did not actually make much of an impact on
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the middle and upper strata of Turkish society. In Zonguldak, for example, an indus-
trial district and one of the most important mining areas of the country with 40,000




 The TLP’s electoral performance was
successful essentially in large cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The total votes





In the elections, the JP received 53 percent of the total votes and won 240 seats in
the parliament, giving it an absolute majority in the assembly. The JP was followed




), with 29 percent
of the votes and 134 seats. The size of the JP’s electoral victory and that of the




 The other impressive result of the elec-
tions was the TLP’s entrance into the National Assembly with 15 deputies. Accord-
ing to one of the leading entrepreneurs of the country, Vehbi Koç, the two most
important events of 1965 were the rapid increase in population and the TLP’s
entrance into the parliament.46
For the party members, the most important and meaningful result of the 1965
elections was not the JP’s so-called victory but the TLP’s electoral performance. For
Boran, for instance, “with the entrance of fifteen socialist deputies to the Assembly,
a critical point in the political life and development of the country has been over-
come.”47 In a circular from TLP’s chairman Aybar, written just after the elections
and representing the enthusiasm of the party in this period, it was stated that the
1965 elections “are our laboring people’s first firm step on the road to power. This
step will be followed by the second and third ones. And our laboring people… will
certainly get power.”48
Most of the TLP’s deputies were the members of its central bodies. This situation
made the parliament and parliamentary activity very important and crucial for the
party’s life. The leadership of the party began to see parliamentary struggle as its
essential means of propaganda for influencing people.49 They were very optimistic
about the TLP’s struggle in the parliament. “In the capitalist system”, Aybar
claimed, “parliament is the most effective platform for socialist parties. Parliament
mirrors parties. What these parties are and whose side they are on clearly come into
light.” He asserted that the TLP had become the laboring people’s voice in the
parliament. Henceforth, there was a socialist opposition in the Assembly whose
political weight was much greater than its numerical weight.50
The TLP was determined to establish a socialist government in the country by
using parliamentary means. However, in the political history of Turkey, there was
no such tradition that might have helped the TLP in its parliamentary activities.
Deputies of the party had no parliamentary experience and were as such all
amateurs. But, “of course, this amateurishness did not last long. In a short time, as
single deputies and as a political party group, we learned our rights and duties and
how the parliament functioned.”51 On every issue that was discussed in the National
Assembly or in parliamentary commissions, the TLP had a chance to state its views
so that it could affect governmental work and propagate its ideas for influencing the
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forward legislative proposals, and submitting oral or written questions, proposing
motions for general discussion and censure. Parliamentary discussions for the
budget provided another opportunity for the TLP to debate the work and problems
of the government and to propagate party ideas.52 It was claimed that the main
motive in these parliamentary activities of the TLP was to defend the constitution
and the general and daily interests of the laboring people.
From their first speeches in the Assembly, the TLP’s deputies set the party’s own
ideology against that of the JP. The TLP’s leadership, by slightly exaggerating the
TLP’s influence in the parliament, claimed that it functioned as the main opposition
party in the parliament; and the real struggle was between the JP and the TLP. For
the TLP leadership there was no essential difference between the policies of the
RPP and the JP. Despite the RPP leadership’s decision to move the party to the left
of the center of the Turkish political spectrum in the process of the polarization of
the political life in the left and right wings in 1965, just before the general elec-
tions, the TLP’s relation with the RPP was not so much friendly in this period.
They were quite careful to distinguish the TLP’s political stance from that of the
RPP. The “so called” turn of the RPP to the left was, according to the TLP leader-
ship, just a political tactic to slow down the political rise of the TLP.53
The TLP’s main criticism of the performance of the JP was that the JP ignored
the social character of the constitution and sought to impede its complete imple-
mentation. As a political organization representing the interests of the ruling
classes, the JP interpreted the constitution in favor of landlords and the big bour-
geoisie and had passed laws which were essentially against the constitution. The
TLP, on every occasion, tried to prove that the government’s general policy, its
legislative proposals, bills and resolutions, were unconstitutional.54 For instance,
in a long speech on November 7, 1965, Aybar, following the party’s general ideo-
logical line, attacked the new government’s program. He stated that contrary to
the government’s belief, there was a regime crisis in Turkey as the present regime
and its government contradicted the constitution. He maintained that the TLP, by
differing from the new government, stood for a planned economy and statism; in
other words, a non-capitalist path of development and reform in land-holding, and
was against the domination of private enterprise and the encouragement of foreign
investments by Turkish governments. Aybar’s critique of the new government’s
foreign policy, however, was the most shocking part of the speech: He raised the
question of the US bases in Turkey and Turkey’s bilateral agreements with the
US and asserted that “today in Turkey, thirty-five million square meters of soil of
our fatherland are under American domination.”55 After this speech, the National
Assembly witnessed many other trenchant speeches by TLP deputies.56
In the course of time, the TLP’s opposition to the JP led to a bitter dispute
between these parties. The TLP’s critiques of the government were answered by the
JP’s growing counter-attacks. In their speeches, members of the JP in the National
Assembly accused the TLP of being a communist party and of stepping outside the
boundaries of the constitution. Their claim was that the TLP used the constitution to
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laboring people. For example, Prime Minister Demirel, in a speech in February
1967, stated “people who have a fancy for, openly or secretly, propagating commu-
nism… are adopting an attitude contrary to the national interests… Interpreting the
Turkish constitution as the protector of communism and Marxism is insolence.” He
added: “The Turkish constitution does not envisage socialism or communism. The
Turkish constitution does not envisage class struggle. The Turkish constitution does
not give the freedom to spread communism.”57
The campaign against the TLP was not only carried out by the JP in the parlia-
ment; it was also carried out by the other institutions of the state. For example,
attacking the main political argument of the TLP in 1967, the president of the
Turkish Republic, Cevdet Sunay, in his May 27 message on the anniversary of the
1960 military intervention, stated that the constitution was closed to socialism.58
After this message Aybar was replying with frustration that “while there is a social-
ist party in the National Assembly, the statements of Mr. President announcing that
our constitution is closed to socialism is a regretful intervention meaning the nega-
tion of multi-party political life.”59 This was not the last attempt of the president to
portray the TLP as a political party not acting within the framework of the constitu-
tion. During his visit to London in November 1967, Sunay was declaring that the
constitution was also closed to “democratic” and parliamentary socialism. In his
message, he was expressing his suspicions about the legitimacy of the TLP in the
Turkish political system.60
The attacks of the JP against the TLP’s deputies were directed especially at
Çetin Altan, one of the most popular leftist journalists of the 1960s. His speeches
in the National Assembly and his writings irritated all the parties, but especially
the JP. But, the strife between the TLP and the JP reached its highest point in
February 1968 when the discussions on the budgets of the Ministry of the Interior
took place in the National Assembly. Throughout his speech, Minister of the Inte-
rior Faruk Sükan tried to prove that the methods and direction of the TLP were the
same as those of communist parties, under the instruction of Moscow. This
provocative speech led to a quarrel between the deputies of the two parties and
ended with the physical attack by the JP’s party group on the members of the
TLP.61 In a speech the next day condemning the attack by the JP, Aybar stated that
the statements of the government declaring that it was in favor of the freedom of
thought and a democratic system had lost their persuasiveness. If a democratic
system, he added, did not comprise both right and left wings, namely, representa-
tives of both capitalists and laborers, and if the interests of these classes could not
be expressed under the guarantee of the constitution, this regime was not demo-
cratic but clearly fascist.62
In his evaluation of the TLP’s parliamentary performance years later, Aybar
stated that after entering the National Assembly the TLP completely changed the
political atmosphere of the place with a small number of deputies63 and, with this
performance, became an important pillar of Turkish political life between 1965 and
196964. Boran, adopting the same line as Aybar, claimed that with its 15 seats the
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the advantages of the parliament very effectively in order to criticize bourgeois
power and its political representatives and spread the TLP’s socialist views. The
TLP had transformed the Assembly into a forum in which the party stood for the
rights and freedoms of the laboring people and all oppressed and exploited masses.65
For Sadun Aren, another prominent leader of the party, deputies of the TLP with
their views and personalities were strangers to parliamentary politics but, in the
course of the time, had begun to determine the discussions that took place in the
National Assembly. These discussions, according to Aren, contributed to the devel-
opment of democracy in Turkey.66 With the defeat of the TLP in the 1969 general
elections,67 however, the party began to lose its political impact both in the
parliament and on the Turkish left in general. This defeat undermined the strategy of
the TLP’s line on the attainment of power by peaceful means, thereby discrediting
the TLP’s ideology and putting an end to the political authority of the party over the
other sections of the Turkish left.68
Conclusion
The TLP’s entry into the National Assembly was one of the most significant and
interesting developments of the period following the military intervention of 1960.
As the main legal organization of the Turkish left in the 1960s, the party openly
represented a kind of radicalism in the Assembly, bringing a new political under-
standing and vision to the parliament. It openly described itself as the political orga-
nization of the workers and laborers and tried to stand for the political and economic
interests of this class. The TLP opposed the political strategies of the other parties
represented in the parliament and supported new radical solutions for the economic
and social problems of the country.
As Sayarı puts it, “the polarization of Turkish politics on a left-right continuum
became much more discernible after 1965 with the TLP’s representation in the
Assembly.”69 As a socialist party in the parliament, the TLP was always the target
of attacks of right-wing parties. The representation of a radical leftist party in the
parliament openly propagating its ideas and attacking the mainstays of the regime
was unusual and unacceptable to these parties. The Turkish political structure and
tradition were strangers to a party like the TLP, so it was almost impossible for the
party to be accepted by this structure and to become institutionalized in it.
The party was determined to construct socialism in the country by using constitu-
tional and parliamentary means. The leaders of the party believed that the TLP
would develop into a mass party and come to power through parliamentary elec-
tions. From its foundation, the ideologists of the party claimed that the 1961 consti-
tution provided a legal framework for the party within which to come to office by
winning a majority in the parliament was possible. They continuously rejected non-
parliamentary methods and the idea that socialism could be built by coups or
guerilla strategies.
However, the emergence of factional controversies within the party towards the
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the TLP’s political strength in the parliamentary arenas and its political impact on the
Turkish left. The TLP was unable to create a powerful historical/political tradition in
the Turkish political structure. The political legacy of the party concerning the strategy
for seizing power did not have a serious influence on the later development of the
Turkish left. This legacy was not perpetuated by the generations that followed. Turk-
ish socialists have been unable either to repeat or to proceed beyond the parliamentary
experience of the TLP for decades. The rejection of the TLP’s program and ideology
by the Turkish political system and a large section of the Turkish left determined the
political fate of the party. The TLP never regained its former political strength. The
party, in the course of the time, became marginalized and turned into one of the small
sects of the Turkish left in the second half of the 1970s.
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